The legal form of each of the elements of the agreement must also be assessed. Finally, it is necessary to overcome the binary distinction between the commitments of developed and developing states, and establish a more differentiated and dynamic architecture.
Introduction
In 2011 it was agreed to launch a new Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) with a mandate 'to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an subsidiary bodies or the adoption of rules of procedure. 11 In the absence of an amendment to the Convention or a new protocol authorizing the COP to adopt binding decisions it is, however, difficult to see COP decisions as a relevant 'legal instrument(s)'.
12
The third option is the least clear. The formulation "an agreed outcome with legal force under the convention" uses language which does not appear in the Convention. It has been suggested that this option "seems to be designed to allow room for the negotiations to end with an outcome that doesn't take the form of the legal instruments expressively contemplated in the Convention, and yet is still 'under the Convention'."
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The term 'agreed outcome with legal force' is considered to be a more ambiguous option than the first two. This option conceivably gives more room for maneuver in negotiating the new climate agreement as it does not limit the result to one instrument. Rather, there could be a package of instruments including perhaps several COP decisions as well as a protocol/-s.
The ambiguity in the formulation 'agreed outcome with legal force' raises the same question as pertains to 'legal instrument', namely whether a non-binding COP decision could qualify as such 'outcome'. An 'agreed outcome with legal force' may well include COP decisions, but not as the sole result. Rather, one (or more) protocol(s) would need to be part of that package. The 'agreed outcome' could, for example, consist of (i) a protocol which in turn empowers the COP or its governing body to "regulate through decisions" similar to article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol which instructs the COP to "define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading", (ii) the decisions taken under that mandate and (iii) of aspirational decisions with a lesser degree of stringency and specificity.
Meanwhile, the possibility has been contemplated that 'an agreed outcome with legal force' could also be interpreted as legal instruments embodied in domestic, rather than international law. 14 Such 'bottom-up' legal construction is reminiscent of an 'implementing agreement' that allows for 'legally binding approaches' based on Parties' municipal law.
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This view, however, is difficult to maintain. In other words, the time frame indicates the necessity of a lengthy process for the 'evolution' from adoption to implementation, reminiscent of a ratification process of an international agreement. Such procedural time-window would neither be necessary for purely domestic solutions, nor for decisions of the COP. Rather, the generous timeframe provides yet another interpretative argument for the legally binding possibilities under the UNFCCC.
3. Which elements should be legally binding?
Introduction
There is no necessary connection between a legally binding instrument and the binding status of each of the elements of such an instrument. While the instrument can be of legally binding nature, its provisions need not be binding.
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One example is the emissions reduction commitment in article 4(2) of the UNFCCC.
This provision is part of a binding instrument, but is arguably not a legally binding obligation. 18 Being part of a binding legal instruments means that also this provision is subject to the accepted principles of treaty interpretation, as reflected in articles 31-33 of the Vienna Elements of a legally binding instrument may also more likely be implemented in national legislation. 19 But its breach will have no legal consequences at the international level.
In the following a functional approach will be applied. It will be asked which elements of a legally binding instrument should, in light of the international legal consequences, have a legally binding character. But it will also be examined whether such elements should be contained in the legal instrument itself, or be delegated to subsequent decisions by the COP.
The legal character of different elements
The legal consequences of including elements of a binding character may be different, will be discussed in relation to the pertinent elements of the legal instrument.
Objectives and principles
The objectives and principles for cooperation may be contained either in the preamble or in 
Emissions reductions and limitations
Emissions The need for legally binding consequences should, however, be assessed in relation to the character of the substantive commitments and of the relevant consequences. For example, it may be asked whether legally binding sanctions should be applied both in relation to violations of substantive obligations and to commitments to provide financial and technological resources. Furthermore, the consequences may be diverse, spanning from a duty to provide a plan on how to bring about compliance to the imposition of financial penalties.
The decisive criterion for establishing legally binding consequences should be the need for establishing the sanctions as a separate legal obligation on the relevant states -in addition to the obligations taken on as part of the climate agreement as such.
It should also be mentioned that a competence to adopt legally binding consequences, respected. This may speak in favour of also establishing the organs and their procedures in a legally binding form.
Regulations in the agreement vs delegation to the COP
The establishment of an institutional framework in the form of a COP and possible other organs is key to ensuring a dynamic cooperation and developing the substantive commitments 
Equity and Differentiation
The success of the negotiations under the ADP will, among other things, also depend on a common understanding of equitable sharing of efforts. While equity is a principle of the Convention, its meaning and scope remain contentious. In general terms, equity refers to the quality of being impartial, fair and just. In the international climate discourse, equity and fairness are used interchangeably. 26 The broad understanding is that the new agreement must reflect states' different "situations", whether they are the stage of development, economic means, risk (exposure and vulnerability) of climate impacts, contributions to increasing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere -both historical, current and future trends -, technological capacities etc. States differ in many regards and these differences must be duly reflected in the architecture of the new agreement.
At the same time, the design of an equitable regime poses a paramount challenge to the traditional structure of public international law, which is based on the sovereign equality of states. States are supposed to be treated equally, where as a starting point the same rights and duties apply to all. There is, however, growing understanding that in order to treat states equally, their differences must be taken into account. The other side of this argument is that developing countries -having historically contributed marginally to the current concentrations -should not be required to take on mandatory commitments to reduce their GHG emissions. The CBDRRC principle is reflected in the "firewall" between developed (Annex-I) and developing (non-Annex) countries and is the main reason for the current difficulties to finding a truly equitable solution.
Differentiation has so far been along the dividing line of "developed" and "developing" states and according to historical contributions of developed countries to environmental degradation, as well as developed countries capability to engage in costintensive environmental mitigation action. These factors (criteria) have led to substantively stronger obligations of developed countries, with developing countries having no or milder obligations as well as entitlements to financial transfers as well as transfer of technology and know-how from developed countries. Based on these criteria, "positive discrimination" in favour of developing countries has led to highly asymmetric environmental obligations continuing. 30 A differentiation of responsibility to address the climate challenge that rests entirely on history contributions is not only not fair -it is not effective. In short, it is dangerous, because it will miss out on those emissions that cause global temperatures to tilt towards 4 degrees or more. Moreover, the traditional binary differentiation does not address the heterogeneity that is found within the group of developing as well as developed countries.
The question is thus how to reflect the different "situations" of states and their dynamic development in the new agreement. The change in the world between 1992 and 2013 tells us that such differentiation cannot be static; it needs to be based on dynamic and flexible parameters, which allow the structure of the agreement to evolve -as the world evolves.
When the ADP was adopted in Durban, the decision was free from references to developed/developing or Annex-I non-Annex countries. Such wording was celebrated as breaking down the traditional firewall between the two major groups. But already the ADP decision from Doha, December 2012, has Parties acknowledge that the ADP "shall be guided by the principles of the Convention". 31 While attempts to include explicitly the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities or to refer to the climate paragraphs of the outcome document of Rio+20 were not successful, the principles of the convention are non-negotiable as guiding principles also for the ADP.
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The argument put forward in this chapter is, that the principles of the convention must apply, but they are not static. Their principled character is a means to adjust and adopt the convention to changing political circumstances. Principles of law provide a necessary means by which law can develop in a dynamic fashion that is responsive to today's problems. 30 See the overview over annual global carbon budgets and trends updated by the Global Carbon Budget, is a continuing process and principles provide for a 'welcome possibility for growth' 34 , in which capacity they also contribute to the development of international law. Principles are never 'finished products'. It is a 'continuing process' from their identification to the final determination of the principles' content in a particular context. 35 While so far, only one particular interpretation of the CBDRRC principle (i.e. differentiation based on historic contributions) has dominated the climate negotiations, the time has come for more countries to put forward their (evolved) understanding of that principle. In Doha, a number of countries came forward with their understanding that the CBDRRC principle is reflective of certain dynamism in the climate regime as it is not set in stone, but evolves over time. In the on-going ADP negotiations, many Parties therefore observed "that the principles [of the Convention] are not rigid, and should be applied in a dynamic and evolving manner taking into account national circumstances, changing economic realities and levels of development." 36 "Principles…need to be forward-looking and take into account what the world might look like in 2020." 37 Some Parties stated that also the application of the Convention "should be adapted in order to improve its vitality and relevance in the modern world and in order to enable it to become a modern instrument to address climate change. It was pointed out that the Convention has evolved, and will continue to evolve over time, and thus the manner in which the principles apply also needs to evolve." 38 Yet, finding reliable, but flexible and dynamic, criteria or means to defining various (groups of) "equals" and allocating rights and responsibilities accordingly, may be an impossible task in multilateral environmental treaty making. Instead, alternatives to criteriabased differentiation should be explored. We suggest as such alternatives self-differentiation within a spectrum of options.
As a starting point, the question of how to treat differentially is different from the question of how to 'group' parties. Traditionally, differentiation has been made along the fault line of "developed" and "developing" countries. This antagonistic dividing line is increasingly blurred and particularly difficult to maintain in a climate context for some of the fastest growing developing countries. Differentiation should thus be flexible and dynamic and only be granted on a temporary basis. In carrying out their obligations, Parties are invited to give highest priority to reduction and control of emissions of the substances with the greatest photochemical ozone creation potential. Innovative is further the requirement that states must ensure that they do not substitute toxic and carcinogenic VOCs, and those that harm the stratospheric ozone layer, for other VOCs.
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The success of the LRTAR is partly due to its restricted regional scope and its comparatively small and homogenous group of Parties. It has nevertheless served as a model for the UNFCCC and the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
One lesson from the VOC Protocol for the climate negotiations is that by giving Parties the (free) choice of option based on certain criteria for availability of that particular option -or no criteria -the Parties themselves can find their 'group' in some form of "self- In addition, the options could differ either in substance (higher baselines or different base years or reference levels, higher emissions caps or less stringent targets) or in form (flexibility for implementation, supplementarity, time frame for implementation etc.) or in both. For example, some options might be equal in substance, but differ in the timeframe for While the optioning-approach could be a feasible way forward it is important to keep the architecture dynamic. Dynamic elements should thus be integrated into the options or complement them (see VOC Protocol, Art. 3). Dynamic elements in terms of technological responses are, for example, the requirement of using "best available technologies" or "best practices". Dynamism in terms of substance can also be maintained by (i) adopting a "critical loads" approach which allow for upward adjustments (ii) regular review of the appropriateness of the targets in the light of latest scientific findings, (iii) by automatic strengthening of commitments in given intervals, adjustments on the basis of available scientific, environmental, technical and economic information (see art. 6 Montreal Protocol) (iv) or by review of the level of ambition by an assessment expert panel.
The point is that there will not be one type of differentiation that "fits all" and covers all the very different circumstances and situations in country Parties. It will be the right combination or "mix" of substantive commitments, incentive structures, entitlements, procedural requirements etc. which will be crucial for the success of a new agreement. A well-designed and fine-tune "catalogue" of options (with differing commitments and/or entitlements) which Parties can chose from upon signature or ratification might be a feasible way forward, reflecting the diversities of a globalized and interconnected world in the sophisticated design of a comprehensive agreement.
Conclusions
The negotiations of the new climate agreement face challenges both regarding its legal form and its principles. The Durban Platform establishes a framework by the requirement that the agreement shall be 'a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all parties'. While the formulation is marked by 'constructive ambiguity', it provides guidance and allows states to choose between the distinctive options of adopting a new protocol, amendments to the UNFCCC (or annexes or amendments to annexes), or a package including delegation of powers to the COP to adopt legally binding decisions. It is also necessary to rethink the relationship between the sovereign equality of states and the meaning of equity in light of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC). The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol make a sharp distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I states. But the economy of and emissions from different states have become so heterogeneous that it is no longer desirable to uphold this binary character of states. There is a need for more differentiation, flexibility and dynamism. This could include the possibility that states choose between different options of substantive commitments ("self-differentiation"), incentive structures, etc., combined with dynamic criteria, such as using "best available technology", or a "critical loads" approach which allows for upward adjustment of commitments.
Such an approach would be less prescriptive than a (unrealistic) top-down structure but more ambitious than mere bottom-up approaches, while leaving necessary freedom and flexibility to the Parties.
